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OIL POLLUTION LEGISLATION:
THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
Although legislation has existed for some time dealing with the problem
of oil pollution from vessels,1 the international community did not seriously
consider the pollution consequences of supertanker technology until the destruction
of the Torrey Canyon off the southwest coast of England.2 The wreck of the
Argo Merchant off the coast of Massachusetts 3 and the Amoco Cadiz tragedy
off the coast of Brittany, France, 4 have left no doubt that catastrophic oil
spills are not only possible, but increasingly likely as the growing world demand
for oil has led to larger tankers. President Carter, in a message to the Congress
of the United States, declared that "the recent series of oil tanker accidents
in and near American waters is a grave reminder of the risks associated with
marine transportation of oil." 5 In this message, he recommended that Congress
approve legislation to establish a single national standard of strict liability for
oil spills. 6 Although comprehensive legislation in this area has been introduced
in every session of Congress since 1975, 7 these bills have yet to gain the
support needed for passage. The major stumbling block has involved the
question of federal preemption of state laws regarding oil spills. At war are
two conflicting interests: the desirability of a uniform, predictable federal
standard which applies nationally versus the rights of states to protect the
environment, local resources and private property within their borders. At
present, it appears that the latter position has triumphed because the Oil
Pollution Liability and Compensation Act of 19788 (S. 2083) introduced by
Senator Muskie, does not include a preemption provision. Instead, it allows
each state to impose additional liability and requirements with respect to the
1. The Oil Pollution Act of 1924, as amended by the Oil Pollution Act, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat.
113, 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-39 (1970) was the first federal statute specifically relating to oil pollution.
However, that Act provided only for criminal sanctions (33 U.S.C. § 434) and the suspension and
revocation of licenses of masters and other officers of offending vessels (33 U.S.C. § 435). Although
the Act was amended in 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1252-1254, to provide that the offender
was liable for all reasonable expenses incurred by the federal government in removing oil from navigable
waters and adjoining shorelines it applied only to "grossly negligent or willful discharges." This Act
was later repealed by the Water Quality Improvement Act, § 101, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1171 (1970).
2. In that incident, approximately 100,000 tons of oil were spilled in the ocean and most of it ultimately
found its way to the shores of the British Isles and the coast of France. While the resulting costs
were somewhat difficult to compute, it is estimated that approximately $15 million was spent on
cleanup and approximately $25 million in claims were asserted, which were ultimately settled for about
$7 million. See F. Cowan, Oil and Water: The Torrey Canyon Disaster (1968); Nanya, The Torrey
Canyon Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 Denver L.J. 400 (1967).
3. Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2083 Before the Senate Comm.
on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978) (General Statement) [hereinafter
cited as 1978 Senate Hearings]. This wreck in December of 1976 caused 7.7 million gallons of oil to
spill into the sea.
4. Id. This supertanker went aground off the coast of Brittany, France, and lost its entire cargo of
230,000 tons of oil. Cleanup costs alone have reached $85 million, as estimated by the French
Government. Final estimates of damages to third parties range from $100 million to $800 million.
5. H. Doc. No. 105, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977).
6. Id. at 2.
7. See, e.g., S. 2162, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 9294, 94th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. (1975-76);
H.R. 14862, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 6803, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 3711, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1187, 95th Cdng., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2083, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977);
S. 2900, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
8. Oil Pollution Liability And Compensation Act of 1978, S. 2083, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 174
Cong. Rec. S. 5396 (daily ed. April 12, 1978).
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discharge of oil within such state.9 This note will assess the wisdom of the
decision of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works to
eliminate the preemption provision in light of the traditional recognition of
the need to maintain uniformity in the maritime law.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Torrey Canyon incident pointed out the overall lack of protection for
innocent parties damaged by oil spills, and work was begun fairly rapidly in
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization' 0 to provide solu-
tions to the problem. The IMOC conference meeting in November'of 1969
concluded with the signing of two Conventions, one of which has been ratified
by the United States and implemented by the passage in the 93rd Congress
of the Intervention on the High Seas Act." The second convention, known as
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(CLC), addressed itself to liability for oil pollution damage. 12 This convention
was submitted to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification,
but the Senate declined to take action because of what it considered to be
deficiencies in the Convention provisions. 13 That fact had been recognized
earlier by various other groups, and in an attempt to rectify the deficiencies,
an additional conference was held in 1971 which resulted in the International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage. 14 That Convention was also submitted to the Senate
and once again the Senate declined to take action. 15
The first significant domestic legislation in this area was enacted by the
federal government in 1970 as the Water Quality Improvement Act. 16 In
subsequent years, Congress enacted the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization
Act 17 and the Deepwater Port Act' 8 which dealt with specific aspects of the
oil pollution problem. In addition, a number of coastal states have enacted
9. S. 2083, § 7(a), supra note 8.
10. IMOC is a United Nations agency.
11. Intervention on the High Seas Act § 2, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1487 (1974). The Act extends certain
rights to coastal states to intervene on the high seas to prevent or minimize oil pollution.
12. Reprinted at 64 Am. J. Int. Law 481 (1970). The CLC speaks to the liability of shipowners whose
vessels carry cargoes of "persistent oils" (e.g. crude oil, animal and vegetable oils) in bulk. It establishes
limits of liability - based on no-fault principles - for pollution damage to the territory or territorial
sea of a party to the convention and these limits cover both the cost of cleanup and property damages.
13. Oil Pollution Liability: Hearings on H.R. 14862 Before the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1976) (General Statement) [hereinafter cited as 1976 House
Hearings].
14. Reprinted at 66 Am. J. Int. Law 712 (1972). The International Fund Convention establishes a revolving
fund which is maintained by annual, mandatory contributions of cargo owners who receive more than
150,000 tons of crude or fuel oil at their facilities during a year.
15. 1976 House Hearings, supra note 13 at 14.
16. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1171 (1970). The Act declared, as a national policy, that there should be no
discharges of oil into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or the
waters of the contiguous zone. It included a legislative requirement for a national contingency plan
for the removal of discharged oil and established liability for the removal costs. It also established a
revolving fund not to exceed $35,000,000, to be available for federal cleanup, subject to recoupment
from the responsible spiller. This act was amended by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, §
101, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1972).
17. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, § 202, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1973). The Act, for the
first time in a federal statute, addressed liability for damages other than cleanup costs by creating a
compensation fund available to respond to damages caused by oil pollution from vessels moving oil
on the marine leg from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline to ports in the continental United States.
18. Deepwater Port Act of 1974, § 2, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1974); 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1974). The
Act established a liability and compensation fund to respond to damages, including cleanup costs, for
oil pollution from offshore facilities constructed pursuant to that Act or from the vessels at those
facilities.
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laws which provide for different degrees of liability and compensation for
damages from oil spills. Taken as a whole, these arrangements provide a
patchwork of different and sometimes conflicting systems of compensation for
oil spill damages. Thus, Congress, recognizing the hardships to victims of oil
pollution as well as the confusion and costs engendered by a lack of uniformity
in state and federal law, directed the Attorney General to study this matter
and make recommendations for legislation to provide a comprehensive system
of liability. 19 Also, the Maritime Law Association of the United States evidenced
its concern over the trend away from uniformity in the maritime law by
unanimously adopting the following resolution:
Resolved, That the Maritime Law Association of the United States considers
it of the utmost importance and in the public interest that maritime law be
uniform to the maximum extent possible throughout the United States; it is
greatly concerned about, and strongly opposes the current proliferation of
disparate State and local legislation adversely affecting such uniformity and
advocates that Congress consider the matter and enact legislation designed to
protect and maintain national uniformity in maritime law. 20
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF UNIFORMITY
Traditionally, the regulation of maritime commerce has been the province
of the federal government. The United States Constitution mandates that
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction are within the federal judi-
cial power. 21 Article III, § 2, together with the "Necessary and Proper"
Clause 22 vests in the federal courts and in Congress the paramount power to
determine the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction and the substantive law to
be applied in the maritime area. These clauses of the Constitution, along with
the underlying commercial necessities, are the cornerstones upon which the
courts have held that there must be a system of maritime law operating
uniformly throughout the country. 23
Uniformity of law in maritime concerns has been promoted by the operation
of the preemption doctrine. Early case law24 determined that federal authority
was paramount in the maritime field since the Constitution was cognizant of
the need for a law of the sea common to all the states and as uniform as
possible with the law of other maritime nations. 25 Even in an area wherein
Congress has not legislated, maritime commerce'is subject to the general
19. 33 U.S.C. § 151 7 (n) (1). See supra note 11.
20. Resolution Unanimously Adopted by the Maritime Law Association of the United States at its Annual
Meeting held on April 25, 1975. Reprinted at Oil Pollution Liability: Hearings on H.R. 9294 Before
the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries, 94th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 289 (1975-76) (hereinafter cited as 1975-76 House Hearings].
21. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
22. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18: "The Congress shall have the power ...to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers, vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any Department or Officer thereof."
23. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558 (1875). In this case, Justice Bradley made one of the first references
to the need for uniformity of maritime law: "One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution
must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in the whole country.
It certainly could not have been the intention of the framers to place the rules and limits of maritime
law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity
and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting
the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states." 88 U.S. at 575.
24. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411 (1866); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 574-575, (1875); Washington
V.W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
25. Maloof, Oil Pollution: Cleaning Up The Legal Mess, 43 Ins. Counsel J. 605 (1976).
[Vol. 6: 126
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maritime law, as defined by the federal judiciary, rather than to state law,
unless the area is one of purely local concern and does not require nationwide
harmony and uniformity. 26 Accordingly, no state legislation in the maritime
field may contravene the essential purpose of an act of Congress or the general
maritime law. 27
The preemption doctrine reached its fullest development in the cases of
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen28 and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart. 29 In
Jensen, the Supreme Court stated, in referring to state statutes in the maritime
area:
And plainly, we think no such legislation is valid if it contravenes the
essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice
to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with
the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations. This limitation, at the least, is essential to the effective operation
of the fundamental purposes for which such law was incorporated into our
national laws by the Constitution itself.30
Three years later, the Supreme Court expanded the preemption doctrine to
its broadest scope in the Knickerbocker Ice case. The Court said:
And so construed, we think the enactment is beyond the power of Congress . . . The
definite object of the grant was to commit direct control to the Federal
Government; to relieve maritime commerce from unnecessary burdens and
disadvantages incident to discordant legislation, and to establish, so far as
practicable, harmonious and uniform laws applicable throughout every part of
the Union. Considering the fundamental purpose in view and the definite end
for which such rules were accepted, we must conclude that in their characteristic
features and essential international and interstate relations, the latter may not
be repealed, amended or changed except by legislation which embodies both
the will and deliberate judgment of Congress. The subject was entrusted
to it to be dealt with according to its discretion-not for delegation to
others. 3 1
The Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice decisions, however, have been limited
by subsequent holdings of the Court. As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
Romero v. International Terminal Co., Jensen and its progeny mark isolated
instances where "state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal
maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a harmonious system." 32 It
appears that Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice have been confined to their facts,
i.e., to suits involving the relationship of the vessels to their crews.
26. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial Commission, 279 U.S. 10Q, 124 (1929).
27. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411 (1866); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 74-75 (1875); Washington
v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Detroit Trust Co. v. fhe Thomas Bartum, 293 U.S.
21 (1934); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945).
28. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). The Court held in this case that the state of New York's workmen's compensation
law was not applicable in the maritime context. The need for uniformity precluded New York from
subjecting foreign shipping to the state's laws on employer-employee relationships.
29. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
30. 244 U.S. at 216.
31. 253 U.S. at 164.
32. 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959).
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The recognition of state power to create rights and liabilities regarding
maritime concerns was expressed in two decisions subsequent to Jensen and
Knickerbocker Ice. In Just v. Chambers, 33 the right of a state to modity or
supplement maritime laws was corifirmed so long as the state action did not
"run counter to federal laws or the essential features of an exclusive federal
jurisdiction. ' 34 Perhaps the first noticeable erosion of uniformity in maritime
law occurred in Wilburn Boat v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 35 In this
case, a divided Supreme Court held a Texas statute relating to insurance
warranties applicable to a policy of marine insurance on a small houseboat
operating on an artificial landlocked lake between Texas and Oklahoma. 'Justice
Black, writing for the majority, concluded that since there was no judicially
established federal maritime rule in this area, the regulation of marine insurance
policies should be left to the states. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result
of the majority, but in his view, the majority opinion went beyond the needs
of the problem before it.36 The opinions in the Just and Wilburn Boat cases
demonstrate a willingness on the part of the Court to allow state regulation
in the maritime area where there is no effect on the essential characteristics
of the maritime law. The Court's application of this principle to oil pollution
legislation occurred in the landmark decision of Askew v. The American
Waterways Operators, Inc. 37
The Askew Decision
"The knell of the uniformity doctrine may well have been struck by the
1973 decision of the Court in Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc., 38 upholding the validity of a state pollution statute imposing strict liability
without limit for all state-incurred costs in removing a wreck, and abso-
lute liability, also without limit, for state-incurred pollution cleanup costs."
Askew involved a request by American Waterways Operators, Inc. for a
declaratory judgment holding the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution
Control Act 39 unconstitutional. A three-judge federal district court declared
the Act unconstitutional in its entirety,40 as in conflict with the Admiralty
Clause, but its decision was unanimously reversed on a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, held that the states
may constitutionally enact legislation respecting pollution and vessels within
their territory so long as the federal government has neither enacted legislation
33. 312 U.S. 383 (1941).
34. Id. at 391.
35. 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
36. In Wilburn Boat, Justice Frankfurter made the following observations: "It cannot be that by this
decision the Court means suddenly to jettison the whole past of the admiralty provision of Article III
and to renounce requirements for nationwide uniformity, except insofar as Congress has specifically
enacted them, in the field of marine insurance. It is appropriate to recall that the preponderant body
of maritime law comes from this Court and not from Congress . . . . What reason is there for
abruptly turning over, pending action by Congress, to the crazy-quilt regulation of the different States
what so long has been the business of the courts?" 348 U.S. at 323.
37. 411 U.S. 325 (1973), reh. denied, 412 U.S. 933 (1973).
38. 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 289 (statement of Herbert M. Lord, representing the
Maritime Law Association).
39. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 376.011-376.21 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
40. American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
[Vol. 6: 126
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inconsistent with that of the state or preempted the field. The decision in
Askew was based on the Court's construction of § 1161 (o) (1) and (2) of
the Water Quality Improvement Act 4' which explicitly waived preemption of
state laws:
(1) Nothing in this section shall affect or modify in any way the obligations
of any owner or operator of any vessel, or of any owner or operator of any
onshore facility or offshore facility to any person or agency under any provision
of law for damages to any publicly-owned or privately-owned property resulting
from a discharge of any oil or from the removal of any such oil.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting any State or
political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirement or liability with
respect to the discharge of oil into any waters within such State.42
The Court admitted that it could not say with certainty whether the Florida
Act conflicted with any of the federal acts on the subject, and limited its
decision to the resolution of the preemption issue. The Court stated:
We have only the question whether the waiver of preemption by Congress in
§ 1161 (o) (2) concerning the imposition by a State of any requirement or
liability is valid.43
Since the Jensen and Knickerbocker Ice cases had been limited to their facts,
the Court declined to extend their reasoning to situations involving shoreside
injuries by ships on navigable waters and held the waiver valid.44 In addition,
the Court limited the significance of two older federal acts by declaring that
the Admiralty Extension Act 45 did not preempt state laws in situations involving
sea-to-shore pollution and that any. federal limitations of liability under the
Limitation of Liability Act 46 run to vessels and not to shore facilities. In short,
absent express federal preemption and any fatal conflict between the statutory
schemes, a state may constitutionally exercise its police power respecting
maritime activities concurrently with the federal government. 47
In the absence of preemption, Askew and Wilburn Boat appear to give
the states extremely broad power to enact legislation regarding maritime affairs.
However, the detisions do not challenge the paramount power of Congress in
the maritime field.48 In light of the above discussion, it appears that the
decision of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, not to
preempt state law in the oil pollution area, further dampens prospects for a
uniform maritime law. The Askew decision has, as of this date, spawned a
number of disparate state statutes in the oil pollution liability and compensation
field.
41. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1171 (1970).
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (o) (1), (2).
43. 411 U.S. at 343-44.
44. Id. at 344.
45. Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1975). The Act provides that the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury to person
or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be
done or consummated on land.
46. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (.1975). The Act limits the liability of vessel owners
to the value of the vessel and freight pending as determined after, not before, the accident. See
Norwich and N.Y. Transport Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. 104 (1871).
47. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941).
48. Maloof, supra note 25, at 611.
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ASKEW'S AFTERMATH:
REVIEW OF DISPARATE STATE STATUTES
Eighteen coastal states have enacted legislation regarding oil pollution in
waters subject to their jurisdiction.49 Although these statutes vary considerably,
they all impose liability of some type for cleanup costs. A minority of states
follow federal law 50 in establishing a ceiling on damages to be paid by polluters,
except in cases of willful negligence. 51 Of these, only New Jersey holds oil
polluters strictly liable. A majority of the state statutes provide for unlimited
financial responsibility, 52 i.e., the polluter is held liable for all costs reasonably
incurred in the removal of oil unlawfully discharged. Of these, five states
provide for strict liability,53 while the remaining jurisdictions subject the polluter
to liability only when fault can be found. 54 Eleven of the eighteen states have
established a state compensation fund from which victims of oil pollution can
be compensated. 55 Five of the states that provide for funds require oil shippers
who transact business in their state to contribute to the fund according to the
number of gallons of oil they transport through that state's waters. 56 Seven
of the state statutes only provide coverage for oil pollution57 while out of the
remaining ten state statutes, five provide coverage for hazardous sub-
stances 58 and five statutes cover a wide range of pollutants. 59 In regard to
damages, thirteen states impose damages for cleanup and containment of the
oil spill on the polluter.60 Out of these jurisdictions, six impose a duty on the
polluter to restore the quality of the water and land damaged by the spill,
49. Ala. Code tit. 22, §§ 140 et seq. (Supp.); Alaska Stat. tit. 46, §§ .03.050 et seq. (1971), §§ .03.210
et seq. (Supp. 1974); Cal. Water Code §§ 13000 et seq. (West 1971), §§ 13142 et seq. (Supp.
1975); Conn. Gen Stat. Ann. §§ 25-54 et seq. (West Supp. 1975); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 376.011 et
seq. (1975), §§ 376.011 et seq. (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Ga. Code Ann. tit. 17, §§ 501 et seq. (1971),
§§ 503 et seq. (Supp. 1974); La. Rev. Stat. §§ 56.1431 et seq. (1952), §§ 56.1431 et seq. (West
Supp. 1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, §§ 541 et seq. (Supp. 1973); Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann.§§ 8-1401 et seq. (1973); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21, §§ 26 et seq. (West Supp. 1974); Miss.
Code Ann. §§ 49-17-1 et seq. (Supp. 1974); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 58:10-1 et seq. (West Supp. 1975);
N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law §§ 71-1103 et seq. (Consol.) (1973), 71-1929 et seq. (Supp. 1974); N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 143-211 et seq. (1974); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 468.700 et seq. (1974); Tex. Water Code
Ann. §§ 21.001 et seq. (1972), §§ 26.261 et seq. (Supp. 1974); Va. Code §§ 62.1-44.15:1 et seq. (Supp.
1973); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 90.48.010 et seq. (19620, §§ 98.48.010) (Supp. 1974).
50. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (f) (1972).
51. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann § 25-54ee; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.12; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.11g; Tex.
Water Code Ann. § 26.266.
52. Ala. Code tit. 22, § 140 (12d); Alaska Stat. tit. 46, § .03.758; Cal. Water Code § 3304; Ga. Code
Ann. tit. 17, § 521.2; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 552; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21, § 27; Miss.
Code Ann. § 49-1743; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.90; Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.800; Va. Code § 62.1-44.34:2B;
Wash. Rev. Code §, 90.48.335.
53. Alaska Stat. tit. 46, § .03.822; Ga. Code Ann. tit. 17, § 521.1(2); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.93; Or.
Rev. Stat. § 468.790; Wash. Rev. Code § 90.48.336.
54. Ala. Code tit. 22, § 140 (12d); Cal. Water Code § 13305; Fla. Stat. Ann § 376.12; Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 38, § 552; Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 8-1409; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21, § 27; Miss.
Code Ann. § 49-17143; Va. Code § 62.1-44.34:2B.
55. Alaska Stat. tit. 46, § .03.030 (c); Cal. Water Code § 13400; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.11; Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 551; Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 8-1411 (f); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.11i; N.Y.
Envir. Conserv. Law § 71-0507; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.87; Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.215; Tex. Water
Code Ann. § 26.265; Wash. Rev. Code § 90.48.390.
56. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.11 (4); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, 551 (4); Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. §
8-1411 (c); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10-23.llh(a); N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law § 71-0507 (3).
57. Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, Washington.
58. Alaska, Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, Texas.
59. Alabama, California, Connecticut, Mississippi, Oregon.
60. Alaska Stat. tit. 46, § .03.758; Cal. Water Code § 13304; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7 5-54ee (b); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 376.09; Ga. Code Ann. tit. 17, § 521.1; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 548; Md. Nat. Res.
Code Ann. § 8-1411; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. § 27 (10); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.84; Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 468.800; Tex. Water Code Ann. § 26.266; Va. Code § 62.1-44.34:2A; Wash. Rev. Code § 90.48.335.
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and when necessary, a restocking of marine wildlife and natural resources that
have been destroyed.61
THE STATES' POSITION ON OIL POLLUTION
The position of the states, essentially, is that they have power to enact
laws regarding maritime affairs in general, and oil pollution in particular by
virtue of. their police power. 62 The right of states to establish their own oilspill
cleanup and liability programs has been upheld in the Supreme Court63 and
this respect for state prerogatives is also firmly established in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.64 Furthermore, the states which have enacted oil
pollution statutes believe that preemption represents an unwise departure from
the well-established Congressional policy of preserving state authority in this
area. 65 The policy of the states who have passed legislation in this area is that
pollution of state waters is inimical to the public health, welfare and safety
of their inhabitants, and therefore should be a matter of state legislative
determination. Another prominent state concern is that the current federal
statute66 and the oil pollution bills which have been introduced to date67 are
inadequate to protect local resources and private property. 68
States are concerned that the virtual total preemption of state law would
result in a national law which is a lowest common denominator, i.e., one
which might provide sufficient coverage in some states, but which would be
significantly less strict or comprehensive than many state laws.69 State
Senator Bernard C. Smith of' New York has summed up his state's position
by noting that state statutes are designed to provide the necessary protections
- and in the cases of concurrent federal programs - the extra protections
demanded by the citizens of the individual states, or dictated by the unique
needs and conditions found in each state.70 As Governor Ella Grasso of
Connecticut explained in her letter to Senator Muskie on S. 2083:
Based on experience, I believe that any legislation that assumes a major
Federal role in oilspill cleanup does not address the real problem. Although
Connecticut is a maritime State oil-spills on navigable waters are minor in
number compared to spills and leakage on land.71
61. Ala. Code tit. 22, § 140 (12d) (Q); Alaska Stat. tit. 46, .03.780; Ga. Code Ann. tit. 17, § 521.1.(1);
Miss. Code Ann. § 49-17-43(b); N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law § 71-1941; Or. Rev. Stat. § 468.745.
62. Maloof, supra note 25, at 608.
63. Askew v. The American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325 (1973), reh. denied, 412 U.S. 933
(1973).
64. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1972).
65. Oil Spill Liability and Compensation: Hearings on S. 1187 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 217 (1977) (statement of Maxine Lipeles,
Environmental Policy Center) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Senate Hearings].
66. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 101, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1970).
67. Supra note 7.
68. OilPollution Liability: Hearings on H.3711 Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation
of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (statement of
Marc Guerin, Division Director, Division of Oil Conveyance Service, Maine) [hereinafter cited as 1977
House Hearings].
69. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 320 (statement of Ernst W. Mueller, Commissioner, Dept.
of Environmental Conservation, State of Alaska).
70. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 307 (statement of Bernard C. Smith, State Senator from
New York).
71. 1978 Senate Hearings. supra note 3, at 22 (letter from Ella Grasso, Governor of Connecticut).
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Governor Grasso's comments support Senator Smith's assertion that each state
has unique needs which only can be protected by that state. Stephen M. Dorn,
a member of the Department of Administration of the State of Wisconsin,
has stated that preemption is not a wise policy because it would make it
harder to remedy any shortcomings in the legislation which might appear
later. 72 In brief, many states recognize the need for a comprehensive program
to supplement the coverage of the existing state laws, but believe that a single
federal law may not be flexible enough to respond to the individual needs of
the different states.
Another reason advanced by the states against preemption is that the level
of government closest to the damaged parties - the state government - is
more able to provide immediate and adequate compensation for losses than
the federal government. Mr. Mueller, Commissioner of the Alaskan Department
of Environmental Conservation, has noted that because of local knowledge and
political institutions, control of oil pollution cleanup and restoration can be
conducted more effectively and completely under the supervision of state and
local officials. 73 Also, the State of Maine submitted a terse statement at the
1977 Senate hearings on this matter and emphasized the need for state action
because states should not have to deal with a remote federal agency that is
uninterested and burdened by red tape.7 4 In sum, there is a concern about
preemption of state laws in any context because of the possibility that the
federal laws will be inadequate and the greater possibility that the federal
laws will be improperly administered. 75
Finally, the probability exists that, in the next few years, a handful of
coastal states will bear the "lion's share" of the environmental impacts of
meeting the nation's petroleum needs. Mr. Mueller has pointed out that new
methods of providing the nation's oil supply, such as offshore drilling, deepwater
ports and Alaskan oil transportation, will benefit the entire nation at the
expense of but a few states. 76 Since these states have generally recognized
their obligation to absorb the necessary impacts, they should have a voice in
determining how they will absorb them. 77
THE COMMITTEE'S DECISION TO
REPORT WITHOUT PREEMPTION
The theory behind the Public Works Committee's decision to report S.
2083 without a preemption provision is that the federal statute is designed to
provide basic protection for both the environment and for victims damaged by
spills of oil.78 States are free to impose greater degrees of protection for their
resources and citizens or may opt to follow the proposed federal statute if
they feel adequately protected. 79 The Committee stated that it would be unwise
to establish a preemptive federal scheme which did not provide the same level
72. 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 355 (letter from Stephen H. Dorn and Harvey Grasse,
Cochairmen; Wisconsin Coastal Zone Coordinating and Advisory Council).
73. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 320 (statement of Ernst W. Mueller).
74. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 68, at 117 (statement of Marc Guerin).
75. 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 249 (statement of Richard A. Frank, Esq., Center for
Law and Social Policy).
76. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 321 (statement of Ernst W. Mueller).
77. Id.
78. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 11 (General Statement).
79. 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 20.
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of protection to citizens and the environment as currently provided under
several state laws. 80 The wide variety of legislative approaches concerning these
issues illustrates the difficulties state legislatures have had in coping with the
oil pollution problem. 81 This difficulty underscores the desirability of state
legislative action so that individually-crafted laws adopted to unique state needs
are allowed to function. The Committee declared that the adoption of a national
uniform law would make it impossible to tailor a liability scheme which
conforms to the demands of an individual state.82
The Committee also rejected the frequently posed argument that preemption
of state liability laws would prevent confusion and delay in adjudication of
claims. Their rejection was based on the fact that the federal bill does not
cover nonnavigable waters or spills on land.83 Since state waters are not
necessarily the same as the navigable waters of the U.S., state statutes might
be applicable to state waters even if totally preempted with regard to navigable
waters. 84 With preemption of state laws, the anomalous result would be the
application of a different standard of liability to navigable waters than to
nonnavigable waters and land. 85 Another consideration which reinforced the
Committee's decision to reject preemption involved state compensation funds.
Most states allocate a certain amount of money to the fund in addition to
the damage surcharges assessed to polluting vessels. The Committee reasoned
that the administrative and financial burden would exist whether states are
allowed to assess damage surcharges or not.86
The Committee concluded by stating that "preemption is a superficially
attractive concern . . . but close examination reveals it is an argument rejected
as flawed and dangerous to the adoption of the federal system 200' years
ago." 87
THE GENERAL NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
The uniformity doctrine of maritime law has a dual foundation: (1) the
need for uniformity with regard to domestic or internal affairs; and (2) the
need for uniformity with regard to international law and foreign affairs. In
regard to the first consideration, the courts have sometimes found the state
policy or interest in support of state legislation overriding and held that the
uniformity doctrine did not bar the state action.88 However, in the area of
foreign affairs, the Court has been reluctant to subordinate the need for
uniformity to any state interest or policy.89 Oil pollution legislation involves a
state interest of the highest magnitude which must be balanced against the
80. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 11.
81. Id. at 21.
82. Id. at 22.
83. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1972).
84. See: Statement of the First Assistant Attorney for the State of Oregon, Oral Proceedings - Approaches
to Oil Pollution Responsibility, 50 Or. L. Rev. 587, 590 (1971).
85. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 22.
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id.
88. See: Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942); Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440 (1960); Victory Carriers v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
89. Note, Oil And Water - A New Look At The Uniformity Doctrine, 26 Baylor L. Rev. 194 (1974);
See also Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) and Windward Shipping Ltd. v.
American Radio Assoc., 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
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need for uniformity and predictability in maritime affairs. In light of the
tendency of later cases to find the need for uniformity subordinate to the
police power interests in support of state legislation, it is clear that uniformity
can only be promoted by the operation of the preemption doctrine. During
every House and Senate hearing at which comprehensive oil pollution acts
have been considered, several arguments have been advanced in favor of
preemption. 90 The basic position of all the various interests in favor of preemption
is that a single problem is being solved in piecemeal, duplicative and costly
fashion.
Users and handlers of oil must have a uniform system available to them
so that meaningful business plans and decisions can be made. Preemption is
essential to an effective nationwide system of oil pollution damage and liability
because the array of state and federal laws creates confusion as to responsibility
for reporting and cleanup. William C. Mc'Neal, Chairman of the Legislative
Committee of the American Waterways Operators, Inc., has stated that
preemption of duplicative state laws and compensation funds is an absolute
necessity because of a fear that oil spill cleanup operations will be delayed
and chaotic, resulting in the loss of promptness and efficiency. This hinders
rather than helps cleanup operations. 91
Another significant problem caused by a lack of uniformity is that some
types of oil pollution are not covered by state statutory provisions, so an
injured party may find recovery impossible with the result that the harm to
the environment may go uncompensated. 92 Furthermore, it is only by preemption
that -claimants can be assured with certainty that their rights to recover
damages will not be dependent on the location of the incident which caused
their injury, or the nature of the source of the oil discharge which caused
their injuryY3 Russell W. Peterson, Chairman of the Council on Environmental
Quality, has noted that limited understanding of the type and magnitude of
future compensable damages underscores the need for a comprehensive
system. 94
Comprehensive oil spill legislation has great significance in the important
effort to help meet domestic energy needs. Major changes in the way oil is
produced and transported, such as exploration of the Outer Continental Shelf,
tanker shipments between the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Terminal and the West
coast, and construction of deepwater ports to accommodate supertankers,
increase the possibility of major oilspills and smaller, but incrementally significant
spills.95 Additional means of obtaining oil are vitally needed, but significant
deterrents to orderly development are "presented by the lack of clear, uniform
90. 1976 House Hearings Before the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries; 1976 House Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries; 1977 House Hearings Before the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries; 1977 House
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries; 1977 Senate Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation;
1978 Senate Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
91. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 275 (statement of William C. McNeal, Chairman, Legislative
Comm., The American Waterways Operators, Inc.).
92. Id. at 211 (statement of Charles P. Eddy, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Dep't of Interior).
93. 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 57 (statement of Adm. Owen W. Wiler, Commandant,
United States Coast Guard).
94. Id. at 107 (statement of Russell W. Peterson, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality).
95. Id.
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standards of protection and the lack of clear incentives for operators of both
facilities and ships to apply strong protective measures against spills." '96
Domestic Considerations
The American shipping industry strongly believes that American ships and
barges engaged in interstate commerce should face uniform regulations and
laws. 97 John Donnelly, testifying on behalf of the shipping industry, stated that
the existing host of pollution laws and funds creates a burden on the shippers
of oil, and in turn, raises the price of petroleum products for consumers. 98 Briefly
stated, since most of the compensation funds are based on a tax on oil, their
proliferation places an unnecessary burden on consumers and the oil industry.
Another factor which supports the desirability of preemption by the federal
government involves insurance coverage. Underwriters have found it impossible
to provide insurance coverage to meet all of the varying standards and limits
of liability provided in the laws of the several states.99 This has resulted in
shipowners and ship operators being uninsured to the extent that state legislation
has imposed greater exposure or higher limits of liability and has failed to
make the federal defenses available. 100 Testimony before members of Congress
has demonstrated that to be insured or partially insured under different
standards is a "most onerous burden for the vessel operator 'who, by the very
nature of his business, must move freely from one jurisdiction to
another." 10 1 In the judgment of those who have testified, there is no suitable
answer to this problem other than federal preemption. Their position is amply
demonstrated by the history of the Florida Oil Pollution Statute. 102 As
Florida authorities sought to enforce the Act's provisions, vessel owners were
unable to sail in Florida waters since special insurance was required for vessels
entering those waters. 10 3 As a result, the most objectionable features of this
Act were repealed in 1974 after the Florida legislature had assessed the damage
caused by the Act to the State's commerce. 104
International Considerations
The need to protect our marine environment transcends state regulatory
power, and should be dealt with on a national and international scale. Former
President Gerald R. Ford stated, when urging Congress to adopt comprehensive
legislation, that "pollution of the oceans by oil is a global problem requiring
global solutions." 10 5 The international community has long recognized that oil
pollution is an international problem because oil is transported in large quantities
in international trade. According to Adm. Owen W. Wiler of the U.S. Coast
96. 1976 House Hearings, supra note 13, at 241 (statement of Joan Davenport, Assistant Secretary of
the Dep't of the Interior).
97. 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 236 (statement of John W. Donnelly, Chairman, Legislative
Comm., The American Waterways Operators, Inc.).
98. Id.
99. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 68, at 45 (statement of Donald H. Miller, representing American
Institute of Marine Underwriters).
100. 1975-76 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 300 (statement of Francis A. Lewis, Insurance Co. of
North America).
101. Id.
102. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.11 (1970).
103. Maloof, supra note 25, at 611.
104. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.11 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
105. H. Doc. No. 214, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1975).
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Guard, it must be recognized that, as oil is transported in large quantities in
interstate trade, "oil pollution resulting from this activity is a federal, rather
than a state problem."' 10 6 Mr. Nicholas Healy, past president of the Maritime
Law Association and counsel for the American Waterways Operators in the
Askew case, has testified before the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Navigation that "by its very nature the sea is international, and in the
association's view, regulation of the maritime environment should, ideally, be
international.' '107
Because maritime trade is essentially interstate or foreign in character, it
requires uniformity of law if it is to be dealt with in a meaningful and fair
manner. 108 The consequences of the existing patchwork of state and federal
laws threatens serious damage to the U.S. economy in the form of a drastic
interruption and diminution of foreign trade. 109 Mr. Herbert Lord echoed the
view of the Maritime Law Association and shipping interests when he testified
at House Hearings that the combined impact of disparate laws and regulations
is detrimental to our foreign trade and domestic waterborne commerce.110 He
also noted that it astonishes foreign shipowners that they cannot safely charter
tank vessels to discharge oil at United States ports and include in the charter
parties (a contract by which a ship is let to a merchant for the conveyance
of goods on a determined voyage to one or more places) a representation that
their vessels qualify for such trades.111
Another possibility that should be considered is the fact that regulation in
this area could have an impact on the field of foreign relations. In the past,
the Supreme Court has been more ready to conclude that state action is
preempted when it affects foreign relations, then when it is of purely local
concern. 112 In a recent case, the Court found the direct impact of an Oregon
law upon the field of foreign relations sufficient to render it invalid, noting
that state law " . . . may well adversely affect the power of the central
government to deal with those problems."' 113 National efforts to secure
international agreements and United States bargaining power at international
conventions could be adversely affected if all coastal states are given a free
reign in the field of oil pollution legislation. 114 Furthermore, if state legislation
makes inroads on international law or foreign policy, it might be attributed
to the nation as a whole, the result being an erosion of the principle of freedom
of the seas which would be detrimental to the United States and other shipping
nations. 115 In sum, the United States position as a flag state requires an
international policy determined at the federal level.
106. 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 58 (statements of Adm. Owen W. Wiler).
107. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 68, at 128 (statement of Nicholas J. Healy, Esq., Healy & Baillie).
108. Maloof, supra note 25, at 606.
109. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 68, at 129 (statement of Nicholas J. Healy, Esq.).
110. 1975-1976 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 68 (statement of Herbert M. Lord).
111. Id.
112. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
113. Zchernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
114. Note, supra note 89, at 204.
115. Id. at 209.
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CONCLUSION
Despite several major oil pollution incidents, this country has yet to devise
a law which compensates oilspill victims quickly and easily. It is clear from
the foregoing analysis that there exists a patchwork of federal and state laws
regarding liability for oil pollution which contains gaps, ambiguities and
conflicts. Although a number of bills which provide a comprehensive national
system to deal with the problem of oil pollution have been introduced in
Congress, none have gained sufficient support for passage because of the
dispute over the question of preemption of duplicative state laws. Two conflicting
interests are involved: the traditional recognition of the need for uniformity
of the maritime law versus the state's interest in protecting local resources
and private property. Early case law confirmed the need for uniformity, but
later cases allow the states more power to regulate in the maritime area when
local interests are involved. As the Court stated in Askew, states may protect
their waters and property from oil pollution damage as long as the federal
government has neither enacted legislation inconsistent with that of the state
or preempted the field. Many states believe that only their legislators can
determine what laws are necessary to combat this problem.
Preemption is essential to the effectiveness of proposed federal oil pollution
legislation and the compensation scheme provided in it. From an environmental
standpoint, preemption is required so that all injured parties are compensated
and all oil spills are cleaned up. Furthermore, if shippers and marine insurers
are forced to comply with disparate sets of laws in almost every port, the cost
of transportation by water is bound to soar, and the public will be adversely
affected in the form of increased prices for waterborne products. Also, without
uniformity, international trade will be reduced which will result in damage to
the United States economy.
The Committee on Environment and Public Works failed to correctly
balance the competing interests when it decided to report the Oil Pollution
Liability and Compensation Act (S. 2083) without a preemption provision.
The states' position has merit, but the need to protect our marine environment
transcends state regulatory power, and should be dealt with on a national and
international level. Uniformity of maritime law is desirable from the standpoint
of those directly involved with maritime commerce, and from the standpoint
of the public as well. Although Congressional action in this area is vitally
necessary, Congress should refrain from enacting into law any oil pollution
bill which does not totally preempt all state laws on the matter.
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